We show that European-style hysteresis can arise in a normative model where labor market institutions are determined optimally. We focus on the government's decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock. The government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse "incentive effects" whereby benefits increase the unemployment rate. It is found that when the shock occurs, benefits should be increased in those economies where the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest. Adjustment costs of changing benefits can introduce hysteresis in benefit setting and unemployment. A good temporary shock can permanently reduce unemployment by making it optimal to have a cut in unemployment benefits. Desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple (requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non-negative) and self-correcting.
I. Introduction
An important challenge in economics is to build a theoretical model that can explain European unemployment. The ideal model of hysteresis should explain two kinds of asymmetries. The first is an asymmetry over time: it should explain how unemployment could increase after an adverse shock and then remain up for a very long period of time. The second is an asymmetry across countries: ideally the theory should also be able to explain why, once the shock disappears, unemployment drops in some countries but not in others. In this paper we aim to provide one such theory. It is based on the idea that labor market institutions are determined optimally.
The contrasting labor market performances of Europe and the US have been the subject of much research. The standard explanation is based on institutions. It is argued that generous unemployment benefits and strict employment protection drive up European unemployment.
1 Of course this, even if true, would not explain either of the two asymmetries. One of the first papers to focus on the problem of hysteresis was Blanchard and Summers (1986) . They argued that when wages are set unilaterally by "insiders", wage (rather than employment) gains would follow the withdrawal of a temporary bad shock. 2 Another literature has made the case for plausible asymmetries in the nature of morale and skill decay following joblessness (see Layard and Nickell (1987) ). When these "duration"
effects are not so severe as to induce withdrawal from the labor force they are a potential source of unemployment persistence. 3 In this paper we take a different approach. We argue that before assessing the performance of positive theories of hysteresis, we must ask if this phenomenon can be explained as the outcome in a normative model.
We present a simple model where the government sets the level of taxes on employed workers to pay out unemployment benefits to the unemployed. The economic environment implies that the current rate of unemployment depends on the generosity of unemployment benefits and a shock. A key feature of our model is that, for some simple cases, we can evaluate the effects of an increase in the level of risk in the economy. Since unemployment benefits are supposed to provide insurance, the level 1 See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , Lazear (1990) , Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) , Caballero and Hammour (1998) , inter alia. See Gregg and Manning (1996) for a review. 2 The debate concerning the "insider-outsider" model of wage determination used in these models includes Hall (1986) , Snower (1988, 1990) , Fehr (1990) , Rotemberg (1999) , inter alia. 3 Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have recently examined the way shocks and exogenous institutions interact to of risk is a key parameter in the formulation of the problem. A large literature in public economics examines the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. 4 In general, however, this literature does not look at the problem of providing unemployment insurance when the level of risk in the environment changes. Changing these models to address this question is not always feasible. For example, the problem studied by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) is how to achieve a certain level of insurance at minimum cost, so that changing some risk parameters in the problem will not answer the questions we are after.
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In an important review article, Blanchard and Katz (1997) have suggested that if unemployment shocks lead to increases in unemployment benefits, then we may have a way to explain the high persistence of European unemployment. Using OECD data for the 1970's and 80's, Di Tella and MacCulloch (1995) presents evidence consistent with the idea that unemployment benefits tend to fall with the unemployment rate (a tax effect) and increase when there are positive changes in the unemployment rate (an insurance effect). In the present paper we formalize Blanchard and Katz's (1997) intuition and show how such "endogenous institutions" lead to hysteresis, even in a normative model of unemployment benefits. 6 Our first task in the paper is to formalize the meaning of policy generated hysteresis. We focus on an objective function, S (b,ε) , where b is a choice variable (i.e. a policy) and ε is a stationary random variable whose value is known when b is set. Changes in the value of ε (for example from 0 to ε1) correspond to shocks. Put simply, hysteresis can exist when the value of adjusting the choice variable, yield unemployment persistence. See also Bertola (1990) and Lemieux and McLeod (1998) . 4 Important papers include Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) on how unemployment insurance (UI) ought to be paid over time, Feldstein (1978) and Topel (1983) on the effect of UI (and UIfinancing) on layoff and quit behavior and Mortensen (1977) on the effect on job search. 5 Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) present a model showing how costly it is to set the wrong (non-optimal) level of unemployment benefits in a general equilibrium model where there are liquidity constraints and moral hazard. We experimented with a (much) simpler version of that model to see if it could be used to study the determination of unemployment benefits at different levels of risk. The fundamental problem encountered is that the parameters that determine the unemployment rate and that could be used to capture the risk in the environment also affect the degree of risk aversion that individuals have. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle in that model what is happening because individuals have become more risk-averse and what occurs because the environment is more risky. 6 Positive theories include the voting model of Wright (1986) and also Atkinson (1990) . Neither of these models, however, considers the role of "incentive effects". These can be thought of as the coefficient on benefits in an unemployment regression. Saint Paul (1996) presents a good review of positive models, and discusses other institutions, such as job security provisions.
b, once the shock occurs, ∆S ε1 , is different than the value of adjusting back once the shock has disappeared, ∆S 0 . This would be true if there is some "adjustment cost" that lies strictly between these two values. Note that unless strong restrictions are placed on the functional form of S(b,ε) to guarantee the occurrence of the special case in which ∆S 0 =∆S ε1 , hysteresis as we define it here will be a pervasive feature of the world. We first show that a sufficient condition for hysteresis to exist is that the degree of concavity at the maximum of S(.) changes with the size of the shock.
This may be helpful in putting more structure to the definition of hysteresis, but as such, says little about European unemployment. For all we know, a formulation where economic variables are used to construct S(.), converting the objective function in our problem into a utilitarian social welfare function, could lead to all the wrong correlations. For instance, it could be that a shock that increases unemployment leads to lower unemployment benefits. Or it could be that hysteresis occurs only for shocks that increase social welfare. This would hardly be descriptive of the European experience after the oil shocks of the 1970's. The challenge for the second part of the paper is to show that, when S(.) is a reasonable social welfare function such as the weighted sum of the utility of the employed and the unemployed, a shock that increases unemployment can reduce social welfare and lead to permanently higher levels of benefits and unemployment, even after the shock has disappeared. We show that this will happen if two key conditions are satisfied. First, the degree of concavity of S(.) at the point where it reaches its maximum increases once the adverse unemployment shock occurs. And second, the shock leads to a higher optimal level of unemployment benefits.
A key condition for the degree of concavity of S(.) to increase with the shock is that the individual utility function has a non-negative third derivative. In other words, we require that individuals do not become more risk averse at higher income, a condition that is satisfied by most utility functions commonly used (for example, logarithmic, CRRA, CARA). The reason why this leads to hysteresis is because all of the effects of the shock on the concavity of S(.) have the same sign for a given level of unemployment benefits. When an unemployment shock takes place, the social welfare function now incorporates some more people on benefits and loses an equal number of people on wages. As long as the replacement rate is less than one, this change will incorporate people who are on a more concave part of their utility function. A second effect is that higher benefit payments to the unemployed mean a higher tax burden. This means lower net wages, so that now the employed are also on a more concave part of the utility function.
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The second condition for European-style hysteresis to exist, namely that unemployment benefits ought to be increased following an unemployment shock, is that the adverse incentive effects of benefits are large. The larger these incentive effects are, the more likely it is that the optimal response to a shock is to raise benefits. The intuition is simple once we note that benefits are set optimally at all times, including the moment just before the shock takes place. If incentive effects are large, benefits ought to be set low prior to the shock to minimize unemployment problems generated by the welfare state. In the limit, we can imagine a situation where unemployment is zero if benefits are zero. Then it is clear that the optimal level of benefits prior to the shock must be zero. But after the shock takes place, the marginal gain from an extra unit of insurance is particularly large.
In contrast to previous models in the literature, the mechanism that yields hysteresis is no longer relevant when unemployment becomes high because tax considerations yield a self-correcting mechanism (see Hall (1986) ). 8 Furthermore, it is simple (requires that the third derivative of the utility function is non-negative) and symmetric in the sense that the same mechanism is at play in the presence of negative and positive shocks. In particular, it does not assume any behavioral asymmetry, between insiders or outsiders or between the long-term and the short-term unemployed. The only adhoc feature is that it requires the existence of "adjustment costs" that are not modeled. We conjecture that an in-depth look at the extended benefit system in the US may provide some empirical clues as to what may give rise to these costs.
Although the paper deals with unemployment insurance, the results seem to have a more general application to other situations where the objective function depends on an individual's utility function. Two key features of this paper -the fact that a shock increases the concavity of the objective function and there are some adjustment costs -are present in the rational design of other institutions such as job security provisions or minimum wages. Section II provides a definition and an outline of the general structure of rational hysteresis. Section III presents the general problem in a simple economic model of optimal benefit setting and solves the simplest case when there is full discounting and no adjustment costs to develop the basic intuition. Section IV includes the effect of an adjustment 7 Another effect with the same sign is described after Proposition 4. 8 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown how hysteresis can exist in the context of irreversible investment decisions made under uncertainty. In contrast our results are not related to the option value of waiting. A more closely related paper, Hamermesh (1995) , shows hysteresis can depend on the history of labor market policies. cost of changing the benefit level and derives the conditions required for hysteresis to occur. Section V discusses the results and empirical implications, while Section VI concludes.
II. Formal Definition of Hysteresis
Define an The conditions required in Proposition 1 for hysteresis to occur could be satisfied by a large number of functional forms. However we still must check that it can hold for a social welfare function: (b,u,T,ε) where b is the level of unemployment benefits, u=f(b,ε) is the unemployment rate and T=g (b,u) is the level of taxes. More importantly, once economic relationships are considered, nothing leads us to expect that hysteresis will occur with the correct co-variation in the variables, in the sense that they are compatible with the European experience. For example, none of the cases covered by part (b) of Proposition 1 will do because European unemployment is not associated with a shock that reduced unemployment. Furthermore, a shock that increases unemployment could easily lead to a lower level of optimal benefits. In other words, nothing precludes that in Figure 1 the function with the shock, S′S′, has a maximum to the left of b 0 . Put differently, we ask if the predictions in our model are compatible with European unemployment, where we ask that an adverse shock that hits the economy and then disappears leaves benefits and the unemployment rate at a higher level and social welfare at a lower level than those prevailing prior to the shock. This is the challenge for the rest of the paper.
III. A Simple Model of Unemployment Benefit Determination

III. A. Individual Preferences
Assume an economy populated with identical risk-averse individuals with strictly concave utility defined over income, U(i) (where U′(i)>0 and U″(i)<0). Individuals cannot save or insure themselves in private insurance markets. 9 The unemployment benefit program pays b t to the unemployed, funding 9 Chiu and Karni (1998) explain the role of private information in the failure of private insurance markets.
it with a tax equal to T t levied on employed individuals at time, t.
III. B. Labor Market
At any point in time we denote the equilibrium unemployment rate, 
III. C. The Government's Problem
We assume that the shock occurring at time t is random but known when benefits are set at time t.
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There is an adjustment cost, m t , to changing the level of the policy variable, unemployment benefits. This is defined in utils and could be due to several factors, including administrative costs and the costs of coordination that are incurred if political support for such changes is required. The government must pay the same cost both when it wants to increase benefits and when it wishes to cut them. Clearly, allowing for differences in adjustment costs could make it more likely that hysteresis obtains.
After observing the shock, the government's problem is to set benefits to maximize the present discounted value of expected welfare, conditional on information at time t, subject to the budget constraint, the possibility that higher benefits may cause higher unemployment and the adjustment costs. If the social rate of time preference equals θ, the government's problem as of time zero is:
10 All the arguments in the paper can be developed using perfect foresight as we simply seek to show that hysteresis can arise in a normative model for some plausible environment. 11 This can be derived from a variety of standard models of equilibrium unemployment, including an efficiency wage model, a union bargaining model or a search model. The following example illustrates. Assume that firms pay workers the gross real wage, W t g , and competition ensures zero profits: π(W t g ,ε t )=0 (where ∂π/∂W t g <0, ∂π/∂ε t <0). Assume workers can shirk on their job (in which case their work effort equals 0) but if caught, they are fired. The expected income from being fired equals the probability of staying unemployed (equal to a(U t ) where U t is the unemployment rate and ∂a/∂U t >0) multiplied by the level of benefits, plus the probability of finding a new job (equal to 1-a(U t )) multiplied by the wage net of taxes and effort costs. This formulation implicitly assumes that newly hired workers who have been caught shirking once are not able to shirk again. The "No-Shirking-Condition" equates the value from exerting effort on the job to the value of shirking: 
where
SW t =(1-u t )U(w t )+u t U(b t ) and w t =w g (ε t )-T t is the net wage.
13 Substituting in SW t for constraints (2) and (3) yields S(b t ,ε t ). This formulation implies the simplest assumption regarding transitional dynamics: each period the government ignores the employment history. Thus, a situation where a person is unemployed for two periods is identical to the situation where that person is unemployed for one period and another is unemployed the next. If we define the value function as:
then the solution to the government's problem satisfies:
This Bellman equation fully characterizes the solution to the government's unemployment benefit problem. More intuition can be gained, however, by examining the government's problem in extreme cases, such as when there is full discounting or when adjustment costs are zero.
III. D. Basic Results with Full Discounting and No Adjustment Costs
As is standard in this type of problem, it is useful to start by assuming that only current period welfare is valued and there are no adjustment costs. The problem reduces to:
The First Order Condition (FOC) is:
When the second order condition holds, the FOC implicitly defines optimal benefits as a function of the magnitude of incentive effects, ∂u/∂b. Clearly if there are no adverse incentive effects of benefits, marginal utility must be equalized across states and there is simply full insurance. Inspection of the FOC above suggests that incentive effects would sometimes tend to reduce the optimal level of benefits. For simplicity, assume that incentive effects are linear and the shock is additive.
14 At each point in time, unemployment is given by u=u f +αb+ε. 15 This equals the sum of frictional unemployment, u f , unemployment arising from the adverse incentive effects of the benefit system, αb, and from random shocks, ε.
Proposition 2: The government should set benefits low when incentive effects are large.
Proof: Compute db/dα<0, using the implicit function rule on the FOC (10). # 14 A sufficient condition for the Second Order Condition to hold under these conditions is α≤u f . It is possible to derive some of the results below for other cases as well, available on request. 15 This makes two simplifying assumptions. First, a linear approximation has been used. Second, it is implicitly assumed that the shock does not directly affect labor market "incentives" (i.e. ∂ 2 f/∂ε∂b=0). The reason is tractability. For details, as well as empirical evidence on the determination of benefits, see Di Tella and MacCulloch (1995) .
The intuition for this result is simple. At the optimum, the government balances insurance against the tax costs to fund the program as well as the adverse incentive effects that unemployment benefits introduce (which increase unemployment). When incentive effects are large the government will try to restrict benefits because, for a given level of insurance, benefits now have a bigger effect on the unemployment rate and the tax burden of the employed. We can now study what happens to the optimal level of benefits when there is an exogenous shock to the unemployment rate.
Proposition 3:
a. When incentive effects are small, the government should reduce benefits following the occurrence of an adverse shock.
b. When incentive effects are large, the government should increase benefits following the occurrence of an adverse shock.
Proof: See Appendix I. # If there are only small incentive effects of benefits on unemployment, benefits should decrease due to exogenous adverse shocks to unemployment. The reason is that benefits should initially be set at relatively generous levels (the replacement ratio close to 1) when α is small so that the main impact of the shock is to raise taxes (via the budget constraint) and reduce the affordable level of benefits.
Perhaps the more interesting case is when incentive effects are large. Initially, unemployment benefits are set at relatively low levels and the optimal response to an adverse unemployment shock may be to increase, rather than reduce, the generosity of benefits. In this case increases in insurance have large positive marginal effects on social welfare in the presence of an adverse shock. Consider an example where utility is logarithmic. If U(x)=logx then pre-shock social welfare is
For simplicity, let ∂w g /∂ε=0. When benefits are set low so that b<<w g , taxes are low and
In the presence of a shock that adds ε1 to the unemployment rate,
The second term has a positive derivative with respect to b, equal to ε1(1/b-1/w g ). Hence if benefits were being set optimally before the shock occurred, well below the wage due to the large incentive effects, there now exists a positive marginal welfare gain from more insurance. The smaller is the initial level of benefits, the larger is the gain from adjusting.
Figure 2 illustrates how optimal benefits vary with the unemployment shock for different levels of the incentive effects. The top curve shows the case when incentives are small, and in most situations tax effects dominate so that shocks lead to lower benefits. The lowest curve shows the case for large incentive effects where shocks lead to increases in benefits. Clearly if ε+u f =0 then b ε =0. As the size of the adverse shock increases, b ε rises before ultimately falling as tax effects begin to dominate benefit setting. Again, it is clear that if ε+u f =1 then benefits must be zero. Note that movements along the top curve lead to relatively large cuts in benefits, whereas movements along the bottom curve (denoting large incentive effects) involve relatively small increases in benefits.
A fundamental aspect of this problem is that the effect of an adverse shock on the objective function (social welfare) is to increase its degree of concavity for a given value of benefits. In other words, the second derivative of the welfare function, with respect to benefits, becomes more negative in the presence of the shock.
Proof: See Appendix I. # There are several effects that give rise to this result. First, an adverse shock shifts a proportion of workers from employment to unemployment. Once unemployed they find themselves on a lower part of their utility function (where U′′ is more negative) since they are now only earning the benefit (which is lower than the wage). Second, an adverse shock cuts the level of net wages by lowering the gross wage that workers are paid and by increasing the level of taxes due to the greater numbers of unemployed. Hence even those workers who stay employed are pushed onto a lower part of their utility function (where U′′ is more negative). Third, the greater numbers of unemployed due to the shock mean that higher benefits have increasingly more severe effects on taxes, which also makes the second derivative of the welfare function more negative.
16
In most cases, the result in Proposition 4 of concavity increasing at a given b will be enough to guarantee an increase in the degree of concavity at the top of the S(.) function once the shock occurs. In some cases, however, the shock will induce too large a change in benefits. It is theoretically conceivable that a large change in benefits could affect the degree of concavity at the top of S(.) by adding a term with the wrong sign (e.g. if the shock induces an increase in benefits that moves the unemployed to a less concave part of their utility function). It is to avoid these pathological cases that we will later impose a restriction "for a small change in benefits". 
III. E. Results Without Full Discounting and No Adjustment Costs
Assume that the government positively weights welfare in future periods and the adjustment cost is zero. The solution to problem (1) remains the same as in sub-section III.D since benefits should be set each period at the level that maximizes S(b t ,ε t ).
IV. Optimal Benefits with Positive Adjustment Costs Yield Hysteresis
In sub-sections IV.A and IV.B we assume that there exists a positive fixed cost of adjusting benefits. In other words, m t =m>0 if |b t -b t-1 |≠0 and is zero otherwise.
IV. A. The Case with Positive Fixed Costs of Adjustment
If the fixed cost of adjusting benefits is very large so benefits must be set initially at a single level that cannot be changed in future periods, then the optimal level of benefits solves the problem:
For intermediate levels of adjustment costs, hysteresis in benefit setting can arise. The easiest way to see this is to start from an equilibrium where ε=0 and benefits are being set to maximize social welfare in the current period.
and
Proposition 5 (Hysteresis): Consider the effect of an adverse shock to unemployment of size, ε1>0.
For sufficiently high rates of time preference, hysteresis can exist for a range of adjustment costs.
Proof: See Appendix I. #
The intuition is that social welfare, drawn as a function of benefits, becomes more sharply "peaked" in the presence of an adverse shock to unemployment. Consequently there exists an asymmetry between the welfare gain from adjusting benefits in the presence of the shock and the welfare gain from adjusting benefits once the shock has gone. Note that our results do not depend on θ→∞. Although the general problem is quite complex, we can gain some understanding about the behavior of the problem by considering an extreme case. Assume that a bad shock hits the economy and it is known, ex-ante, that the shock will disappear after one period and that it will never return. It is easy to see that unemployment benefits should be adjusted provided ∆S ε1 -m>∆S 0 /θ. After benefits have been changed and the shock has disappeared forever (i.e. ε=0 for all current and future t) the government may still want to keep benefits at their old level. By not changing the government saves on adjustment costs today, but loses the social welfare gain of having the "correct" level of benefits in the future. This means that there will be hysteresis provided m>∆S 0 (1+θ)/θ. Thus, even if the shock takes such an extreme form and the future is not completely discounted, there will be hysteresis as long as:
Note, however, that as the rate of time preference becomes small there can be no hysteresis. When there does exist hysteresis in benefit-setting, there exists a corresponding hysteresis effect in unemployment. The reason is that if unemployment benefits are increased in the presence of a shock but not subsequently reduced once it disappears then the unemployment rate will also increase but not subsequently return to its pre-shock level. The extent of the rise in unemployment depends on the size of the incentive effects of benefits. satisfying ∆S 0 <m<∆S ε1 , and the government's rate of time preference is high so that it only values current period welfare, then it is worthwhile for benefits to be increased to b ε1 in the period that the shock occurs but not reduced once it disappears. The unemployment rate also does not return to its initial value, due to the higher level of benefits.
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The purpose of this section is to characterize the amount of hysteresis in the economy.
Definition 1:
If ρ and ε * are two shocks such that:
then the degree of hysteresis in the economy, η, can be characterized by:
Given the uncertainty structure, this measure best captures the asymmetric range of inaction of the government when it sets benefits. When η is larger than one, it reflects the asymmetry resulting from the increase in the degree of concavity of the social welfare function in the presence of an unemployment shock. The more the degree of concavity rises, the larger η becomes. The smaller the change in concavity, the closer η is to one.
The nature of this measure can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 . They are drawn for the case of large incentive effects and when only current period welfare is valued due to a high rate of time preference. In the presence of a shock that increases unemployment, but is smaller than ε * , benefits should not be changed due to the cost, m, of doing so. In the presence of a shock that reduces unemployment, benefits should also not be changed provided that ε>-ρ. In Figure 4 , η is the vertical distance between points D and F divided by the vertical distance between points A and B. If there are no changes in the degree of concavity of S(b,ε) between points F and B then these two distances must be the same.
Consider the example of a shock that is marginally larger than ε * . Benefits should be increased
. Once the shock has disappeared, benefits should be kept at b(ε * ). Only if a shock reduces unemployment by more than the level measured by the horizontal distance between points O and C should benefits be cut. Figures 3 and 4 show that the nature of the solution to problem (1) follows an (S,s) rule: when the size of the shock deviates sufficiently from its previous value at which benefits were being set optimally, benefits should be adjusted so that they become optimal for the size of the new shock.
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Further intuition can be gained by expressing the degree of hysteresis in terms of the concavity of the objective function. Provided |b(ε
(using second order Taylor approximations). Hence: 18 There is a related literature on (S,s) pricing rules where the shock is usually assumed to be non-stationary.
where ∆P is the percentage change in concavity. Thus, our hysteresis measure suggests that the ratio of the ranges of inaction is proportional to the square root of one plus the percentage change in concavity.
V. Discussion
V. A. Good Shocks
As in previous models of hysteresis, temporary good shocks may now have permanent effects on unemployment. Consider the effect of a good shock that temporarily lowers unemployment risk in the economy. When this occurs, there is less demand for insurance and a relatively large welfare gain to be captured by cutting benefits. Provided this gain now exceeds the adjustment cost of changing benefits the government can increase social welfare by reducing benefits and keeping them low in future periods (in the absence of further shocks).
In Figure 5 The direct effect of the shock is to increase social welfare to S(b ε1 ,-q) at point E on the curve, S′′S′′. In traditional models, with exogenous benefits fixed at b ε1 , the good shock could only lead to a temporary reduction in unemployment. However if benefits are set optimally they should be cut to b -q in the presence of the good shock so that welfare can be further increased by
(from point E to point F). After the shock has disappeared (and in the absence of further ones) the level of benefits remains low at b -q and consequently the unemployment rate is also lower in future periods compared with the case of exogenous benefits.
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V. B. A Succession of Bad Shocks
A different implication of the model from the previous literature concerns the effect of a succession of 19 It is possible to argue that the good shock could be generated by some government action.
adverse shocks. Most (positive) models of hysteresis lack a self-correcting mechanism so it is possible that the unemployment rate could increase monotonically with the occurrence of negative shocks (see Hall (1986) ). This does not occur in the present model. Two cases are worth analyzing. In the first case, insurance effects continue to dominate benefit setting, whereas in the second case tax effects dominate.
The first case occurs when an economy gets stuck at a high level of unemployment because benefits get stuck at a high level after a shock. This is the standard case depicted by point D in Figure   1 . Now imagine that a second, even bigger shock hits the economy. Social welfare falls below S′S′ and, if insurance considerations prevail, the new maximum lies to the right of b ε1 . Assume that it is optimal to adjust benefits up in the presence of this big shock. It is also true that the gain from adjusting benefits down will now be bigger than ∆S 0 . Thus, a bigger shock may actually make it optimal to have an adjustment down of benefits.
A second case concerns bad shocks of such large magnitude that tax effects, rather than insurance effects, begin to dominate the government's benefit setting problem. First, assume that a bad shock has driven up optimal benefits and, because of institutional adjustment costs, it is optimal not to reduce them once the shock disappears. Now assume that a further bad shock hits the economy that leaves unemployed a large proportion of the labor force. In the traditional hysteresis models there are no self-correcting mechanisms. In our model, there always comes a point where the shock is sufficiently large that benefits must be reduced by the government directly due to its budget constraint.
Proposition 6: As the unemployment rate tends to 1, the benefit level that maximizes current period social welfare decreases in the presence of an adverse shock.
Proof: See Appendix I. # Appendix III contains a numerical simulation of the model.
V. C. The Natural Rate of Unemployment
Work on the natural rate of unemployment defines it independently of aggregate demand conditions and the current rate of unemployment (Friedman (1968) , Phelps (1968 Phelps ( , 1994 ). 20 Previous work on hysteresis has pointed out that this distinction may be overstated. A similar point can be made in this model. Only if institutions (in our case benefits) are set exogenously can we define a natural rate of unemployment, u n , independently of the random shocks affecting the economy: u t =αb t +ε t ⇒ u n =E(u t ) =αb t where E(ε t )=0. On the other hand, if benefits are set optimally, then the "natural rate" will in general depend on the history of shocks to unemployment, via the effect of these shocks on the level of benefits: u n =E(u t )=αb(ε t ,ε t-1 ,ε t-2 ,…).
V. D. General Discussion and Empirical Implications
In seeking to provide the simplest environment where hysteresis will emerge out of a normative process, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions. In our view, most of them are licit in the sense that there is no reason to think why a more sophisticated model would show such assumptions to be implausible. An example is the assumption that the shock does not affect incentive effects that is implicit in the linear approximation to labor market equilibrium. Whereas a more detailed model of the labor market may certainly have the property that the effect of the shock on ∂u/∂b is non-zero, there is no reason to believe that it must be so.
There is one exception however. The model is built around the assumption of a fixed value of the adjustment cost, in the sense that it does not change with the shock. More formally, the adjustment cost, m, is denominated in utils. An alternative model would put m inside the utility function, so that paying this cost in bad times costs more in utils. A couple of issues are worth noting, however. First, such an approach will reduce the set of shocks for which there is hysteresis, but it does not eliminate them. Second, once this is done, we really need a theory of what causes these adjustment costs. For example, one may wonder why we should not explicitly make m a function of the shock. A plausible assumption is that political coordination costs are smaller in bad times. This would mean that the original assumption of m being fixed in utils could again become correct to a first approximation. A limitation of our approach is that we do not have a theory of the behavior of these adjustment costs. All we do is characterize the behavior of the economy for the case when these costs are fixed in utils.
Our results suggest that European unemployment, in some limited sense, may be optimal. If there were high costs of changing institutions in Europe, the optimal course of action after the oil shocks in the 1970's could well have been to increase benefits and not lower them after the oil price came down. Another way of putting it would be to note that the period of high unemployment that follows a shock is not too costly in terms of welfare, particularly since it is associated with high unemployment benefits.
The empirical prediction of our theory is that unemployment benefits in Europe should have been raised after the oil shocks in the 70's and then kept high during the 80's. It also predicts that unemployment should have risen with the oil shock as well as with the increase in generosity of the unemployment benefit program during the 70's and then should have dropped partially during the 80's once the oil shock disappeared. This is consistent with the evidence (see Di Tella and MacCulloch (1995) ). Figures 6 and 7 illustrate with the case of Spain and compare it with the US. 21 The differential performance between the US and Europe could be explained if the cost of changing institutions is lower in the US. The implication is that the coordination, legislative and political costs of changing the level of benefits are higher in Europe.
A particularly simple way of reducing these costs would be to specify explicitly in advance a rule or formula defining how benefits are going to be adjusted in the presence of a shock. An example would be a contingent rule such as unemployment benefits are x if the unemployment rate is less than y and z if it rises above y. The U.S. has such a rule in the Extended Compensation Act. Japan and Canada also have variants of these laws. These countries have laws stating that benefits depend on aggregate unemployment conditions. In the U.S., the The OECD measure of benefits describes the parameters of the unemployment benefit system. It is calculated as the pre-tax average of the unemployment benefit replacement ratios for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment (see the OECD Jobs Study (1994) for details).
adverse shocks that increase the unemployment rate also increase benefit generosity, by law. If this type of legislation lowers the adjustment costs of changing benefits we may expect to observe less evidence of hysteresis: benefits would be more likely to be increased in the presence of an adverse shock but returned to their initial value once the shock has gone. In fact, the U.S. Federal/State
Extended Compensation Act does specify that "extended benefits cease to become available when the insured unemployment rate does not meet either the 20 percent requirement or the 5 percent requirement". In other words, the primitive in our model is differences in how easy it is change unemployment benefits rather than differences in the generosity or otherwise of these programs across countries. In some sense this is closer to the way the word "institution" is often used by authors such as North (1990) , where attention is given to the rules of the game, rather than the outcomes.
From a positive point of view, an empirical prediction of the model is that, other things equal, differences in the government's rate of time preference should explain changes in the unemployment benefit system. A possible way of capturing differences in impatience is to focus on political color, as it is sometimes argued that left-wing parties discount the future more than right-wing parties. It is also possible that the length of the electoral cycle influences the government's discount rate. Then we may expect to see less evidence of benefit hysteresis in countries that have longer periods between elections.
VI. Conclusions
A number of economists have blamed European unemployment on labor market institutions. Since institutions are primitives in these models, a lot of the dynamics have been left unexplained. Consider for example, the time path of unemployment benefits. Figures 6 and 7 show them increasing sharply in the US and Spain in the years immediately after 1973 and 1979. A similar pattern is present in the data for other OECD countries. If we believe institutions are exogenous, we must also believe that these countries were incredibly unlucky. Just when they got hit by an oil shock, politicians decided to increase benefits, worsening their unemployment problems. Only the US turned out to be lucky in the 1980's when benefits returned to their pre-shock levels. A less ad-hoc story involves developing a theory where institutions are rational. In such a theory, unemployment benefits can certainly increase the unemployment rate, but it should also allow us to understand what drives movements in benefits.
This is the objective of our paper.
We present a model where the government sets unemployment benefits to maximize social welfare in response to an unemployment shock, subject to a budget constraint and the possibility that unemployment benefits may introduce incentive problems that increase the unemployment rate. The following results can be established:
1.
In the absence of incentive effects (whereby higher benefits increase the unemployment rate)
there should be full insurance. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, should be set lowest (highest) when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest (smallest).
2.
In response to a shock that increases unemployment, benefits should be increased in those economies where the adverse incentive effects are most severe. The intuition for this result stems from the fact that benefits are set optimally at all times, including the moment just before the shock occurs. Thus, large incentive effects imply a low initial level of benefits and large welfare gains derived from better insurance when there is an unemployment shock.
3.
In the presence of an adjustment cost of changing the level of benefits there may exist hysteresis in benefit setting and unemployment. In other words, the level of benefits (and unemployment) may rise in the presence of an adverse shock and remain higher than the initial value once the shock has disappeared.
4.
The reason for the asymmetry is that a shock increases the degree of concavity of the objective function (social welfare). This occurs because the shock incorporates into the objective function a group of people who are on a more concave part of their utility function. This suggests that the key assumption driving hysteresis is that the individual utility function has a positive third derivative (people do not become more risk averse as they become richer). Contrary to previous models, we do not require any behavioral asymmetries between "insiders" and "outsiders" or between the short-term unemployed and the long-term unemployed. And when unemployment tends to one, tax considerations prevail so the mechanism is self-correcting.
5.
As in previous models of hysteresis, temporary good shocks may now have permanent effects on unemployment. The reason is that lower unemployment reduces "risk" in the economy and may make lower benefits optimal.
Appendix I
Proof of Proposition 1 a. Consider the outcome when ε changes from 0 to ε1 to 0 (i.e. the shock is of size ε1 
Integrating both sides again gives 
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting in SW (b,u,T,ε) , for constraints (8) and (9) yields S(b,ε). The effect of a shock on the marginal gain from increasing benefits is:
where ∂w g /∂ε<0 and r=-U′′(w)/U′(w) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
a. As α→0, the FOC (10) implies that U′(w)→ U′(b) and from (A1):
which is negative. Hence using the implicit function theorem, benefits should be cut following the occurrence of an adverse shock when incentive effects are small. b. If incentive effects are large so b is small then:
which is positive provided that the utility function is strictly concave and the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, r, has an upper bound. Hence using the implicit function theorem, benefits should be increased following the occurrence of an adverse shock when incentive effects are large. #
Proof of Proposition 4
The second derivative of the social welfare function is:
The effect of a shock on the concavity of the welfare function for a given value of b is: (using 2 nd order Taylor approximations). #
Proof of Proposition 6
As u→1 in equation (A1), ∂ 2 S/∂ε∂b becomes negative (for given α). Hence using the implicit function theorem, db/dε<0. # 
Optimal Benefits with Adjustment Costs
Now assume that adjustment costs satisfy 0.01<m<0.02. In such a case, it is worthwhile for the government to raise benefits in the period that the temporary shock occurs but not to reduce them once ε=0. If m=0.015 then in the period of the shock, social welfare can be increased by 0.005 (∆S ε1 -m=0.02-0.015) by raising benefits from b 0 =0.13 to b ε1 =0.32. In the period that the shock disappears, benefits should not be cut since this would result in a welfare loss equal to -0.005 (∆S 0 -m=0.01-0.015). Unemployment does not return to its initial value, due to the higher level of benefits. After the shock has gone, the unemployment rate equal 0.10, which is 0.03 higher than its pre-shock value. -q)-m=-0.105-(-0.13)-0.015) . In the absence of further shocks, benefits will permanently remain at this lower level. Unemployment also remains low, equal to 0.05, compared to its pre-shock value of 0.10. After the second shock has gone, it is worthwhile to cut benefits back to their initial value, b 0 =0.13, since the gain from doing so, even after paying the adjustment cost, is positive. It equals 0.015 (=S(b 0 ,0)-S(b ε2 ,0)-m=-0.14- (-0.17)-0.015=0.015) . Unemployment returns to its initial value of 0.07.
Good Shocks
A Succession of Bad Shocks
